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Abstract
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument on quantum mechanics in-
completeness is formulated in terms of elements of reality inferred from
joint (as opposed to alternative) measurements, in two examples in-
volving entangled states of three spin-12 particles. The same states
allow us to obtain proofs of the incompatibility between quantum me-
chanics and elements of reality.
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1 Introduction
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly review some
opinions on a controversial point in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’s (EPR) [1] ar-
gument. In section 3 we introduce some notations and a more detailed form
of the sufficient condition for joint inference of several elements of reality
(ERs) in the same individual system. In section 4 we formulate EPR’s in-
completeness argument in terms of ERs inferred from joint measurements
(instead of alternative incompatible measurements as in the original paper
and all its sequels), in two entangled states of three spin-1
2
particles: an ex-
tension to three particles of Hardy’s two-particle state [2], and GHZ-Mermin
state [3, 4]. In section 5 we show the incompatibility between quantum me-
chanics (QM) and ERs (Bell’s theorem), in the same entangled states used
in section 4. Finally we summarize our conclusions in section 6.
2 Elements of reality and EPR’s incomplete-
ness argument
In 1935, EPR presented an argument to prove that QM only provides an “in-
complete” description of physical reality [1]. Their conclusions were striking
because of “the very mild character of the sufficient condition for the reality
of a physical quantity on which their argument hinged” [5]: “If, without in
any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with prob-
ability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.”
There is a problem, however, in EPR’s argument: “... one cannot make
both measurements [position or momentum of one of the particles in the orig-
inal EPR example], and hence both predictions [position or momentum of the
other particle], simultaneously” [6]. The joint (“simultaneous”) existence in
the same individual system of ERs corresponding to two incompatible observ-
ables is inferred from the possibility of measuring either of two also mutually
incompatible observables1; this fact has been pointed out as “the most sig-
1 In [8], Redhead discusses how, if the minimal instrumentalistic interpretation of the
QM formalism is complemented by any of several possible views (p 45), then “the argument
for incompleteness of the QM goes through without any consideration of the alternative
possibilities of measuring [several incompatible observables]” (p 78). The locality principle
1
nificant lacuna” in EPR’s reasoning [7]. For EPR’s incompleteness argument
to be valid [6, 7], counterfactual definiteness (CFD) [6, 9] is required, either
as an additional assumption [7], or deduced from locality [9]. Independently
of how natural it may appear, in our opinion this spoils EPR’s own dic-
tum: “The elements of the physical reality cannot be determined by a priori
philosophical considerations, but must be found by an appeal to results of
experiments and measurements” [1].
In their argument, EPR use the ambiguous expression “can predict” in the
condition for existence of ERs in a broad or “weak” sense [6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14],
meaning that it is possible to make any of the alternative measurements that
would provide the data for either inference. But, as it has been pointed out
[6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], “can predict” can also be interpreted in a narrow or
“strong” sense, meaning that we actually do have sufficient data to predict
with certainty the concrete result to which the ER is ascribed. It is a common
belief that EPR’s argument does not work if this strong sense is required:
“The EPR argument goes through only if “can predict” is understood in the
weak sense” [14] (see also p 1885 of [10], or p 142 of [13]); EPR themselves
said: “Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that
two or more physical quantities can be regarded as simultaneous elements of
reality only when they can be simultaneously measured or predicted. On this
point of view, since either one or the other, but not both simultaneously, of
the quantities P and Q can be predicted, they are not simultaneously real.
This makes the reality of P and Q depend upon the process of measurement
carried out on the first system, which does not disturb the second system
in any way. No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit
this” [1]. The main aim of this paper is to show how we can formulate an
EPR argument using ERs predicted in the strong sense2.
and the inference of only one element of reality (in the singlet state, in Redhead’s example)
will be enough to prove QM incompleteness (p 77). In this paper we will prove how EPR’s
argument on QM incompleteness can be reformulated restricting ourselves to a minimal
set of assumptions, both on QM interpretation (minimal instrumentalistic interpretation,
in Redhead’s terminology), and on the condition for existence of ERs.
2Such form of the argument will not work for systems with only two spacelike sepa-
rated parts: in these systems, any couple of joint ERs predicted in the strong sense will
correspond to one observable on each of the two spacelike separated parts, that are always
compatible; in order to have ERs in the strong sense for incompatible observables we need
three or more spacelike separated parts.
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3 Elements of reality inferred from joint mea-
surements
We will call strong elements of reality (SERs) those obtained from EPR’s cri-
terion, taking “can predict” in the strong sense. The name also reflects their
actuality, in contradistinction with the ones used in EPR’s paper and in most
of the literature: SERs have definite predicted values, instead of an abstract
existence without concrete values as the ERs inferred using the weak sense of
“can predict”. Note, however, that EPR’s criterion is a sufficient condition,
and that the set of assumptions used to infer SERs is in fact weaker: the
CFD implicitly used in the original EPR argument is not required3.
We will guarantee the clause “without in any way disturbing a system”
in EPR’s sufficient condition by requiring that the system to which the ER is
assigned be outside the future light cones of the points at which we perform
any observation needed to make the prediction. This is how the ERs were
inferred in EPR’s original paper: “since at the time of measurement the
two systems no longer interact, no real change can take place in the second
system in consequence of anything that may be done to the first system” [1].
More explicitly, we formulate the sufficient condition for existence of a SER
in the following way.
Let us consider a physical system with two parts S1, S2, and two spacelike
separated regions R1, R2 of the respective world tubes. If we can predict with
certainty the concrete value of a physical quantity in R2 from the result of
a measurement performed in R1, then there is a strong element of reality
corresponding to that physical quantity, at least in the part of the world
3The word counterfactual is used in several contexts: quoting Ballentine [9], “Counter-
factual definiteness (abbreviated CFD) ...occurs in the EPR argument when they assert
that if we had measured the position of particle 1 we could have learned the position x2
of particle 2, and if we had measured the momentum of particle 1 we could have learned
the momentum p2 of particle 2. Although only one of these measurements can actually
be carried out in a single case, the conclusion that both values x2 and p2 are well defined
in nature is an instance of CFD.” Counterfactual is used also to qualify those predictions
that are not actually tested (or even that cannot be tested); in this sense, we subscribe
Pitowsky’s opinion [15]: “This [the fact that the experiment to test a prediction cannot
be conducted] does not render the prediction invalid. It simply makes it untestable.” We
think that counterfactuality in this second sense is less worrying that the one involved
in the first, where the joint inference of several ERs is based on alternative incompatible
measurements.
3
tube of S2 outside the future light cones with vertices in R1 and prior to any
external perturbation of S2.
The SER need not be the value of the physical quantity itself, as long
as it determines univocally such value. For instance, in Bohm’s theory the
position of a particle in a Stern-Gerlach apparatus determines the value of the
corresponding spin component [16]. Nevertheless, to simplify the discussion
we will identify the SER with the value of the physical quantity that it
predicts.
Our next step is to illustrate when several SERs can be jointly assigned
to the same individual system. Suppose that we make a measurement in a
region R1 of the world tube of S1, and that the result obtained allows us
to infer a SER r(2) for S2 following our previous criterion. On the same
individual system, suppose that a second observer makes a measurement in
a region R2 of the world tube of S2, spacelike separated from R1, and that
his result enables him to infer a SER r(1) for S1 in its originally prepared
state (prior to any disturbance). The persistence of the SER r(2) after the
measurement at R2 is not guaranteed (in general the measurement disturbs
the subsystem S2; it could even destroy it!); the same can be said about the
SER r(1) after the measurement at R1. According to the sufficient condition
for existence of SERs, we can assign to that individual system two joint
SERs, r(1) and r(2), at least in the parts of the world tubes outside the future
light cones with vertices in R1 and R2 (loosely speaking, in the parts of the
world tubes “previous” to the measurements).
For any pair of (point-like) events, one in each region, there is always an
inertial reference frame in which both events are simultaneous. Therefore,
it is tempting to adopt the usual terminology and denote the joint SERs
as “simultaneous” SERs, but we have avoided this in order to emphasize
that the combined existence of r(1) and r(2) in the same individual physical
system does not depend on any external choice of a reference frame. We
need not worry about instantaneity of measurements or simultaneity of three-
dimensional sections of the four-dimensional world tubes of S1 and S2, and
the generalization to systems with three or more extended spacelike separated
parts is immediate: the only requisite on the compound system is that we
can make predictions with certainty about properties (possibly non-local)
of the individual system in some spacetime regions (prior to any external
disturbance), based on measurements performed in other spacelike separated
regions.
4
4 EPR’s argument in terms of joint SER
We are going to follow EPR’s previously quoted dictum on the necessity of
finding ERs “by an appeal to results of experiments”, and reformulate their
argument using only ERs jointly inferred from actual measurements (our
previously defined joint SERs), without a priori use of alternative inferences.
Joint SERs will be obtained for observables that have no common eigenstate;
this is a stronger condition than the simple incompatibility; even if they do
not have a basis of common eigenstates, two incompatible observables can
share some eigenstates; the existence of joint SERs in one of these states will
not prove QM incompleteness (of course, Pˆ , Qˆ have no common eigenstate,
but other incompatible observables without this property have been used in
the literature).
Consider a system of three spin-1
2
particles in spacelike separated regions,
prepared in the entangled spin state (in the basis of eigenstates of the oper-
ators σˆ(j)z , j = 1, 2, 3),
|ψ〉 = a (|+++〉 − |+−+〉 − |−++〉) + b |− − −〉 , (1)
with 3 |a|2 + |b|2 = 1, and ab 6= 0.
In this state,
Pψ
(
σ(2)x = −1
∣∣∣σ(1)z = +1
)
= 1 , (2)
Pψ
(
σ(1)x = −1
∣∣∣σ(2)z = +1
)
= 1 , (3)
where Pψ
(
σ(2)x = −1
∣∣∣ σ(1)z = +1
)
denotes the conditional probability of ob-
taining the value σ(2)x = −1 if σ(1)z = +1. If we measure σˆ(1)z on the first
particle and obtain the result +1, property (2) allows us to assign a SER
σ(2)x = −1 to the second particle, at least as long as it is not disturbed.
Analogously, if a second observer measures σˆ(2)z on the second particle and
obtains the result +1, property (3) allows him to assign a SER σ(1)x = −1 to
the first unperturbed particle4.
4Of course, after measuring σ
(1)
z , σ
(2)
z , the values predicted for σ
(1)
x , σ
(2)
x cannot be
verified, and in this sense these joint SERs are also counterfactual, but at least the mea-
surements needed to infer both values can be made in the same individual system, and
joint counterfactual (alternative) inferences are not involved; see footnote 3.
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Consider now the non-local (and non-factorizable) observable defined by
the projector
pˆi(1+2) = 1− |−−〉 〈−−| , (4)
in the system formed by the first and second particles. This observable pˆi(1+2)
is compatible with σˆ(1)z and σˆ
(2)
z but not with σˆ
(1)
x and σˆ
(2)
x ; in fact, it is easy
to check that there is no common eigenstate to the three operators σˆ(1)x ⊗1(2),
1(1) ⊗ σˆ(2)x and pˆi(1+2).
In state (1),
Pψ
(
pi(1+2) = 1
∣∣∣ σ(3)z = +1
)
= 1 . (5)
Consequently, if a third observer measures σˆ(3)z and obtains the result +1, he
can assign a SER pi(1+2) = 1 to the system formed by the first and second
particles.
The probability of obtaining the results σ(1)z = +1, σ
(2)
z = +1, σ
(3)
z = +1
in a joint measurement of the three observables σˆ(j)z in spacelike separated
regions of the same individual physical system is not zero:
Pψ
(
σ(1)z = +1, σ
(2)
z = +1, σ
(3)
z = +1
)
= |a|2 . (6)
In an individual physical system in which these three results are obtained,
following (2), (3) and (5) we can infer three joint SERs: σ(1)x = −1, σ(2)x = −1
and pi(1+2) = 1. Because there is no common eigenstate of the corresponding
observables, according to EPR we would conclude that the quantum state
“does not provide a complete description of the physical reality” [1] of this
individual system.
We could attempt a similar incompleteness argument in the state of the
first two particles given by
|η〉 = 1√
3
(|++〉 − |+−〉 − |−+〉) , (7)
which is an example of a Hardy state [2] that verifies properties (2) and
(3) and is an eigenstate of pˆi(1+2) with eigenvalue 1. But then, the values
σ(1)x = −1, σ(2)x = −1 and pi(1+2) = 1 would not satisfy our condition to be
considered joint SERs, because the preparation of the state (7), in which the
value pi(1+2) = 1 rest, is not spacelike separated from the measurements used
to infer the two other values; the measurements of σˆ(1)z , σˆ
(2)
z are in the future
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of the preparation of the state (7), and therefore their precise results in an
individual system could be influenced by the preparation.
As we said in footnote 2, three or more spacelike separated parts are
needed in order to meet the condition for existence of joint SERs for in-
compatible observables (of course, ERs might exist without this sufficient
condition being fulfilled, but following EPR, we should not concern ourselves
with more precise definitions of the ERs). The third particle in our example
(1) is a device to allow us the use of the sufficient condition for existence of
joint SERs, although the SERs inferred involve only the first two particles;
in the next example the three particles play a more symmetrical role.
A stronger incompleteness proof can be worked out in the GHZ-Mermin
[3, 4] state of three spin-1
2
particles:
|µ〉 = 1√
2
(|+++〉 − |− − −〉) . (8)
Let us denote Aˆ1 = σˆ
(2)
x ⊗ σˆ(3)y , Aˆ2 = σˆ(1)y ⊗ σˆ(3)x , Aˆ3 = σˆ(1)x ⊗ σˆ(2)y . In this
state we have,
Pµ
(
Aj = εj
∣∣∣ σ(j)y = εj
)
= 1 , εj = ±1 , j = 1, 2, 3 . (9)
There is no common eigenstate to any two of the observables Aˆj, and
nevertheless we can infer joint SER for the three of them, by measuring
σˆ(j)y in spacelike separated regions, whatever the results obtained in these
measurements (in our previous example we have to restrict ourselves to those
individual physical systems in which σ(j)y = +1, j = 1, 2, 3). The price to pay
for this extension of the argument to all individual systems in state (8) is
that the three incompatible observables to which the joint SER are assigned
are now non-local (although factorizable), instead of one non-local and two
local observables in the previous “probabilistic” example.
In both examples (1), (8) the incompleteness argument has been formu-
lated in terms of joint SERs, inferred from joint (“simultaneous”, in the
usual terminology) local measurements in causally non-connected regions
of the same individual system, which was considered impossible until now
[10, 13, 14].
7
5 Bell-EPR theorem in terms of joint SER
In recent years there have been many proofs of Bell-EPR theorem [17] “with-
out inequalities” [2, 3, 4, 11]. Arguments similar to those in the last section,
in the same entangled states, lead us to proofs of these kind that are simple
variants, using joint SERs, of Hardy’s [2] and Mermin’s [4] results.
State (1) has the following additional properties
Pψ
(
σ(2)z = −1
∣∣∣σ(1)x = +1
)
= 1 , (10)
Pψ
(
σ(1)z = −1
∣∣∣σ(2)x = +1
)
= 1 , (11)
Pψ
(
σ(1)x = +1, σ
(2)
x = +1, σ
(3)
z = +1
)
=
1
4
|a|2 . (12)
If we measure the observables σˆ(1)x , σˆ
(2)
x and σˆ
(3)
z , and obtain +1 in the three
cases (the probability for this is not zero, according to (12)), properties (10)
and (11), together with property (5), allow us to infer respectively three joint
SERs associated with the compatible observables σˆ(2)z , σˆ
(1)
z and pˆi
(1+2), with
predicted values −1, −1 and 1, respectively. But according to QM, in a
joint measurement (feasible in principle) of these observables in any state, if
the first two results are σ(1)z = σ
(2)
z = −1, the third one will necessarily be
pi(1+2) = 0: QM is not compatible with EPR’s elements of reality, even in
their less controversial form (joint SERs).
State (1) is the tensor product of the Hardy state (7) by state |+〉 of the
third particle, entangled with the product of state |−−〉 of the first two par-
ticles by state |−〉 of the third one. The presence of the third particle allows
us to prove the incompatibility with QM (Bell’s theorem) using three joint
SERs that can never be found as results of the corresponding measurements,
not only on state (1), but on any quantum state; by contrast, Hardy’s two
ERs, σ(1)z = −1, σ(2)z = −1, can never be obtained in a joint measurement in
state (7), but states in which these results can be obtained do trivially exist.
The contradiction between ERs for compatible observables and QM found
by Mermin [4] in the GHZ-Mermin state (8) can also be formulated in terms
of joint SERs. Let us denote Bˆ1 = σˆ
(2)
y ⊗σˆ(3)y , Bˆ2 = σˆ(1)y ⊗σˆ(3)y , Bˆ3 = σˆ(1)y ⊗σˆ(2)y ;
then we have,
Pµ
(
Bj = εj
∣∣∣ σ(j)x = εj
)
= 1 , εj = ±1 , j = 1, 2, 3 , (13)
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Pµ
(
σ(1)x σ
(2)
x σ
(3)
x = −1
)
= 1 . (14)
If the three σˆ(j)x are measured in spacelike separated regions of the same
individual system in state (8), equation (13) allows us to infer three joint
SERs, Bj = εj , that must verify the relation ε1ε2ε3 = −1 following equation
(14). On the other hand, the product of the three compatible observables
Bˆj is the unit operator, and therefore there is no quantum state in which
the results of their measurement in the same individual system satisfy that
relation (each result will be ±1, but the product of the three is always +1).
This proves again the incompatibility between QM and joint SERs.
Note that all observables used to infer ERs in sections 4 and 5 are (local)
spin components, and therefore there would be no difficulty for their joint
measurement and the corresponding inference of joint SERs. Non-localities
appear only in the observables to which the ERs are assigned; in this sense
the experimental check of some of the predictions in sections 4 and 5 could be
problematic, but our (gedanken) examples show the differences between QM
theory and any theory that includes EPR’s elements of reality: independently
of any experimental confirmation of either theory, we have shown that ERs
cannot be used to “complete” QM.
6 Summary
Working only with what we have called “joint SERs”, inferred from joint
measurements in the same individual physical system (a more actual kind
than the usual ERs inferred from alternative incompatible measurements),
we have reached the following conclusions.
(i) If we accept a very mild sufficient condition for the existence of ele-
ments of reality, joint SERs for observables without any common eigenstate
will exist. On these premises, QM would be incomplete. This formulation of
the EPR argument in terms of joint SERs was considered impossible.
(ii) There are sets of joint SERs for compatible observables that, according
to QM, can never be obtained as results of the corresponding joint measure-
ments in any individual system. However plausible, elements of reality are
incompatible with QM (Bell’s theorem).
Both theorems have been proved using quite similar arguments in the
same entangled quantum states (1), (8).
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